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A Case of 'Great Unstableness':  
 A British Slaveholder and Brazilian Abolition 
 
The Historian, vol. 60, no. 4 (Summer 1998) 
(forthcoming) 
 
Matt D. Childs 
The University of Texas at Austin 
 
The reluctant obedience of distant provinces 
generally costs more than it is worth 
-Lord Macaulay (1800-1859) 
 
 In 1845 the British-owned St. John d'el Rey Mining Company operating in 
the Brazilian province of Minas Gerais, reached an agreement with the recently 
liquidated Cata Branca Brazilian company to rent 385 slaves for fourteen years.  
The contract signed in London detailing the transaction specified that "all of the 
said Negroes. . . shall at the end of the said term of fourteen years be and become 
absolutely free and emancipated."1  But in 1859, after fourteen years of service, 
the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company (hereafter St. John) did not grant the Cata 
Branca slaves their duly entitled freedom.  The breach of the contract and the 
illegal enslavement of over three hundred individuals went unnoticed for nearly 
twenty years.  The mining company took special precautions to insure that the 
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Cata Branca slaves never learned of the freedom clause during the period 1845-59 
and especially after the contract had expired.  Only in 1879 did the flagrant 
violation of the contract by the St. John become known to the general public.  
Shortly thereafter, judicial authorities, prompted by Brazilian abolitionists who 
rallied around the cause, liberated the slaves.2 
 The employment of slaves by the British-owned mining company and 
their commitment to retaining technically free women, men, and children as 
slaves stands in contrast to the general historiography that portrays Great Britain 
and the British as staunch proponents of the worldwide anti-slavery crusade.  It 
was precisely this contradiction that politically weakened and isolated the British 
company, coupled with the clear violation of the contract, that made the St. John 
vulnerable to the abolitionists' attack to liberate the slaves.  The illegal 
enslavement of the Cata Branca slaves by the mining company served as an early 
catalyst in the Brazilian abolition movement that provided a special opportunity 
to launch the anti-slavery campaign in Brazil in 1879.  The court case that 
brought harsh criticism to the mining company from governments in Britain and 
Brazil and united the cause of abolitionism on both sides of the Atlantic has 
received the attention of only a few scholars of abolition, and just passing 
mention by historians of the St. John.3 
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 The St. John mining company provides an interesting case of putting a 
new perspective on an old topic of abolition historiography:  the relationship 
between capitalism and slavery.   Ever since Eric Williams published his seminal 
work Capitalism & Slavery in 1944, the two concepts have figured at the center of 
historiographical debates on slavery in the Americas.   Williams concluded that 
slavery "developed the wealth of Europe. . .[b]ut in doing so it helped to create 
the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century, which turned round and 
destroyed the power of commercial capitalism, slavery and all its works."4  Over 
the last fifty years scholars have argued over the applicability of Williams' 
conclusions emphasizing that political and reform movements played a 
significant role in the abolition process and slavery remained a profitable 
enterprise during the nineteenth century.   The case of the British-owned Saint 
John mining company represents a reversal of the forces Williams identified 
leading to abolition.  Instead of industrial capitalism in Britain representing the 
solvent to slavery in the Americas, Brazilian abolitionists attacked a British 
industrial enterprise operating in Brazil dependent upon slave labor.5 
 Until recently scholars challenging the Williams thesis have 
predominantly  battled over broad macro-economic and political terrain.  The 
latest generation of scholars examining the abolition process throughout the 
Americas have focused on the slaves as central actors in the process leading to 
abolition.  This trend has produced a crescendo of works in Brazilian 
historiography emanating from the centennial of Abolition in 1988.  Historians of 
                                            
4
 Eric Williams, Capitalism & Slavery (1944; reprint, London, 1964), 210. 
 
5
 The historiographical debate over the Williams thesis is covered in Barbara L. Solow and 
Stanley L. Engerman, eds.  British Capitalism & Caribbean Slavery:  The Legacy of Eric Williams 
(Cambridge, 1987). 
 
4 
 
Brazilian slavery have shown how slave resistance contributed to the abolition of 
the Atlantic slave trade in 1850, the passage of the Free Womb Law emancipating 
children born to slave mothers after 28 September 1871, and the final destruction 
of slavery in 1888 through massive flights from plantations in the 1880s.  An 
examination of the St. John's illegal retention of free men, women, and children 
as slaves complements the revisionist Brazilian literature by analyzing how the 
political environment of abolition in 1879--shaped by the slaves' own desires and 
actions for freedom--provided an ideal opportunity for Brazilian abolitionists to 
begin the anti-slavery crusade.6 
 The St. John began operations in Southeast province of Minas Gerais at the 
city of São João d'el Rei in 1830.  The board  of directors anglicized the spelling of 
the city to give their enterprise a name. In 1834 the mining company transferred 
their activities to a richer and more profitable lode at the town of Morro Velho, 
located 160 miles north across the mountain range.  The establishment of the 
mine represents part of a larger wave of British investment in Brazil during the 
nineteenth century.  Although the construction of railways stands out among 
British investments, mining remained a lucrative industry despite the passing of 
the gold boom in the previous century.  The rich lode at Morro Velho continued 
to produce a wealth of gold during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  By 
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World War I, Morro Velho had become the deepest mine in the world, and when 
mineral extraction ended in 1934, the mine shaft extended 2,453 meters (8,051 
feet) below the earth's surface.  The depth of the mine corresponded directly to 
the wealth of the company.  Of all British investments in Latin America during 
the nineteenth century, no other company equaled the St. John in average yearly 
profits.7   
 While financial capital and advanced technology, not to mention favorable 
geological factors, account for the economic success of the St. John, a productive 
labor regime proved equally important in determining net profits.  The Annual 
Reports of the company from its founding in 1830 through the nineteenth century 
contain repeated reference to the difficulty of attracting a steady labor force 
resulting from worker resistance to adopting what historian E. P. Thompson has 
described as capitalist "time-discipline."  Thompson's description of English 
"Northern lead-miners who left their work for the harvest" in eighteenth-century 
Britain can apply equally to free Brazilians of Minas Gerais in the nineteenth 
century.8  In 1844, for example, mine superintendent Charles Herring 
complained that "34 native labourers" left their jobs despite the fact that "wages 
on the whole had been raised for these people."9  When English traveler Richard 
Burton visited the mines twenty years later, the situation had not changed:  "The 
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free Brazilian showed a decided indisposition to work at Morro Velho" in favor 
of "only. . . desultory agriculture."10   
 Slave labor proved more reliable, and as a result, more profitable.  By 1867 
the labor force of the mining company had grown to nearly 1,700 slaves, the 
majority of those rented from other slaveowners similar to the Cata Branca 
slaves.  According to historians Amilcar Martins Filho and Roberto B. Martins, 
who have studied in detail the demographics of slavery in Minas Gerais, "the 
Saint John del Rey may well have been the all-time largest slave-based 
enterprise" in the province.11  Scholar Robert Conrad is surely correct in 
suggesting that the St. John represented the "largest single British slaveholding 
organization in Brazil."12  Because of the difficulty of recruiting a yearly 
disciplined free labor force in Minas Gerais, slave labor constituted an essential 
ingredient in determining the company's economic success.   
 Although slavery remained legal in Brazil until the "Golden Law" of 1888 
declared abolition, the fact that the St. John was British-owned, with 
headquarters in London, provoked considerable controversy with Her Majesty's 
government.   The British government committed itself to the abolitionist 
struggle throughout the nineteenth century.  In 1807, the British slave trade was 
abolished and in 1833 slavery ended in the British colonies.  Great Britain then 
focused its abolitionist zeal on other countries of the Americas.  In Brazil, the 
British navy intercepted slave-trading ships, freed slaves, and even broke off 
diplomatic relations over the slave question.  While the motivations behind Great 
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Britain's abolitionist struggle have occupied the attentions of historians as either 
humanitarian or imperialist, it is only logical that once Britain outlawed slavery 
and the slave trade, it would oppose slave trading and slavery elsewhere to 
reduce the advantage competitors derived from cheap labor and to stay true to 
the principles the country professed.  In 1845, the British Parliament passed the 
Aberdeen Act which, in addition to other provisions, prohibited British citizens 
from purchasing slaves.  The board of directors of the St. John successfully 
lobbied Parliament to include a provision that allowed British citizens to 
maintain ownership of slaves purchased before the passage of the law and 
permitted the renting of slaves from other slaveowners.  According to a letter by 
the board of directors to Lord Aberdeen, author of the act, "the amount of capital 
invested in British mining in Brazil is very large" that would "at once [be] 
destroyed" if slaves could not be employed at Morro Velho.13   
 The clear contradiction between Great Britain's official position on slavery 
and the employment of slave labor by the St. John did not go unnoticed in 
Britain.  In 1848 the British House of Commons and in 1849 the House of Lords 
both established Select Committees on the Slave Trade to investigate how Britain 
might best suppress the slave trade and slavery.  Charles Herring, who served as 
superintendent of the mine at Morro Velho from 1830 to 1846, became one of the 
first individuals to testify before the House of Lords Select Committee.  Herring's 
testimony followed a brief statement made by a thirty-one year old slave named 
Augstino [sic] who retold the horrors of the middle passage and the arduous 
labor at Morro Velho.  Herring reported to the Select Committee because of the 
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scarcity of free labor in Minas Gerais, slave labor proved more productive since 
wage laborers would often leave to work elsewhere or farm their own land.14   
 Following Herring's testimony, a series of articles in the English press as 
diverse as the Daily News, the Mining Journal, the Morning Post, and the Anti-
Slavery Reporter appeared criticizing the St. John's labor practices.  A letter to the 
editor of the Daily News on 13 November 1849 summed up British abolitionists' 
indignation over the activities at Morro Velho by stating the mining company 
represented a "monstrous incongruity of British subjects possessing slaves, hiring 
them--in fact purchasing them--when Her Majesty's government is endeavouring 
by every means, to abolish slavery!"15  The St. John board of directors responded 
by claiming slave labor represented the only option, saying that slaves were 
treated "better than the working class of Europe," and "nothing is left undone 
that can be done for their good."16  In 1850 the St. John board of directors even 
sent an "independent" commission to Morro Velho that wrote a fifty-page 
Circular to calm troubled stockholders by assuring them of the "humane and 
generous. . .  measures already adopted. . . to render them [the slaves] as 
contented and happy as men can be expected to be, whose lot is to earn their 
bread by the sweat of their brow."17 
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 Despite the efforts of the British government and  abolitionists, the St. 
John would not cease their employment of slaves while wage labor remained 
scarce in Minas Gerais and slavery legal in Brazil. The protests of the British 
abolitionists and government, while ineffective in changing the employment of 
slave labor at the mine, did have consequences.  A commercial enterprise 
operating in a foreign country often relies on the support and backing of its 
respective country during times of economic or political difficulties.  The 
opposition of the government and the abolitionists served to isolate and 
debilitate the political influence of the St. John, making it susceptible to the 
future action of Brazilian abolitionists over the Cata Branca slaves in 1879. 
 Although British abolitionists initiated their campaign against the St. John 
in 1849, no such activity by Brazil abolitionists occurred until thirty years later.  
Minas Gerais, the location of the St. John Morro Velho mine, represented a 
province where slavery hung on tenaciously and even expanded in the 
nineteenth century.  Although there is no general agreement among scholars on 
exact population figures, and more importantly, the explanation for the growth 
of the slave population and the primary economic activity of slaves, most concur 
that Minas Gerais represented the largest slaveholding province in Brazil during 
the 1870s-80s.  After the abolition of the international slave trade in 1850, there 
occurred a significant shift in the slave population as a result of the internal slave 
trade from the Northeast to the booming coffee plantations of the Southeast.  One 
historian has argued that the transfer of hundreds of thousands of workers 
resulted in the gradual awakening of antislavery passion at the points of slave 
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depopulation while it solidified pro-slavery beliefs at the areas of relocation.  
Minas Gerais corresponded to the latter category.18 
 The pattern of voting in the Chamber and the Senate on the 1871 Law of 
the Free Womb emancipating children born to slave women may have reflected 
the central support for the slave system in the coffee regions. The slave 
population in the three Southeastern provinces of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, 
and São Paulo represented fifty-four percent of the entire slave population in 
Brazil in 1872.  Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo represented twenty-
eight of the forty-five votes against the Law of the Free Womb in the Chamber, 
and five of seven in the Senate.  The province of Minas Gerais, the location of the 
St. John mine, opposed the law more strongly than any other; fourteen of the 
forty-five votes against the law in the Chamber and three of seven in the Senate 
were by representatives from Minas Gerais.19 
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 To strike a decisive blow at the institution of slavery, the abolitionists' 
movement would have to aim at the geographical heart of the institution: the 
Southeast.  By 1879, abolitionist speeches and literature had begun to circulate on 
a limited scale throughout the country, but anti-slavery feelings rising among the 
populace had yet to fully express itself in the form of an organization or catalytic 
event.  Surrounded by other slaveowners, the St. John's slave practices appeared 
secure.  The contradiction between Great Britain's policy on the slave trade and 
the St. John's labor practices, however, attracted Brazilian abolitionists to the 
Cata Branca case.  Furthermore, although the British mining company operated 
in the center of the slave economy, the vast majority of bondsmen in Minas 
Gerais worked in agricultural production.  What appeared as strong support for 
the slave provinces of the Southeast in the Chamber and the Senate as reflected 
in the Law of Free Womb voting, more accurately represented the political-
economy of coffee cultivation.  In this environment, the discovery of the St. 
John's retention of the Cata Branca slaves after they should have been freed 
became especially explosive.20 
 The general public became aware of the St. John's unlawful retention of 
the Cata Branca slaves two decades after the contract specified manumission.   In 
August 1879, Joaquim Nabuco denounced the British mining company in the 
Brazilian parliament.  The shocking news of a British company denying freedom 
to slaves quickly circulated through the press in Brazil, Great Britain, and 
elsewhere.  In France, the Revue des deux mondes smugly pointed out the 
contradiction Nabuco's speech revealed between Great Britain's policy on slavery 
and the actions of British citizens in Brazil: "Given the current circumstances, 
what is particularly ironic, is that the company, its directors, and stockholders all 
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belong to that English nationality which has been so critical of Brazil every time 
the question of slavery has been raised!"21  Nabuco, of course, did not by himself 
discover the St. John's disregard of the 1845 contract.  In a rare moment of poetic 
justice, the mining company had itself accidentally attracted the attention of 
Brazilian authorities to the illegal enslavement. 
 In 1871 the Brazilian parliament passed the Law of the Free Womb that 
emancipated all children born to slave women after 28 September 1871.  In order 
to insure compliance with the law, Article 8 required the registration of all slaves 
throughout the Empire.  Section 2, Article 8 specified: "The slaves who, through 
fault or omission of the parties interested, shall not have been registered up to 
one year after the closing of the register, shall, de facto, be considered as free."22  
The requirement for registering slaves placed the St. John in a precarious 
position. If the mining company failed to register the Cata Branca slaves, they 
would receive their freedom, and thus, lose several hundred unpaid laborers.  
Moreover, if the Cata Branca slaves remained unregistered, and then later earned 
their freedom for not being registered, an investigation might have occurred to 
determine the owner of the slaves that could have revealed the 1845 contract and 
its subsequent violation.  The St. John could not claim ownership of the slaves 
because the proof, the 1845 contract, clearly stated manumission after 14 years of 
service.  In 1872 James Gordon, superintendent of the Morro Velho mine, 
claiming to represent the Cata Branca Brazilian company, registered the slaves as 
belonging to it.23 
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 Although unapparent at first, Gordon had seriously miscalculated by 
registering the slaves as belonging to the Cata Branca Brazilian company.  
Initially, no one seriously questioned his act; the common practice of renting 
slaves by the St. John probably countered any suspicion the registry office might 
have had as to the veracity of superintendent Gordon's statement.  Although 
Carlos Rebello Horta, described simply as a "citizen,"  did report to the judge of 
the municipality of Sabará in 1872 that the Cata Branca Company had been 
extinct since 1845 and related the stipulation for emancipation in 1859, no action 
was taken at this time.  Only five years later did legal proceedings against the 
mining company begin.  In 1879, Joaquim Nabuco exposed superintendent 
Gordon's lie by asking the Brazilian parliament how "could it be permitted in this 
country to register in 1872 more than 200 persons as slaves belonging to an 
extinct company?"24  The Rio News would later explain the inactivity by stating: 
"The simple truth is that these authorities resided a little too near the richest gold 
mine in Brazil."25   
 The Rio News correctly pointed out the strong economic and political 
influence the St. John exerted over the area surrounding the Morro Velho mine, 
but the reasons legal action developed so slowly in defense of the Cata Branca 
slaves were more complex. As discussed earlier, abolitionist sentiment had yet to 
attract a large following in Brazil by 1872.    Both historians and contemporary 
participants tend to concur with Luís Anselmo da Fonseca who wrote in 1887:  
"In Brazil the present abolitionist movement began in 1879."26  The Chamber of 
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Deputies of the Brazilian parliament became the focus of the Brazilian 
abolitionists struggle in 1879. The St. John's illegal enslavement of the Cata 
Branca slaves played a central role in the opening battle.27 
 Joaquim Nabuco, eager to make a name for himself and emerge from the 
long shadow of his famous father, an elder statesman of the Empire who died in 
1878, championed the cause of the Cata Branca slaves in the Brazilian parliament.  
Inspired by Bahian Deputy Jeronymo Sodré's anti-slavery speech of 5 March 
1879, Nabuco utilized the Chamber's lectern to forward the abolitionist cause 
during the legislative session of 1879.  Although only a freshman in the Brazilian 
parliament, his dramatic and eloquent speeches quickly earned him the respect 
of his supporters and the fear of his enemies.  Gilberto Freyre did not exaggerate 
when he later described Nabuco as a "blazing orator."28  Indeed, Martim 
Francisco, who defended the slavery position against Nabuco's attacks in the 
Chamber, pleaded with him in October of 1879 "not to put his beautifully erudite 
oratorical skills at the service of a cause that could greatly damage our 
country."29  According to Nabuco's daughter Carolina, the issue of the Cata 
Branca slaves represented Nabuco's first full public commitment to the 
abolitionist cause.30 
 Nabuco's exposure of the St. John's retention of technically free men, 
women, and children as slaves on 26 August 1879 elicited a lively response from 
the chamber.  He quoted from the contract the provisions that detailed the 
                                            
27
 BCCD, Anais (1879); Carolina Nabuco, The Life of Joaquim Nabuco, trans. Ronald Hilton 
(Stanford, 1950), 52-58; Toplin, Abolition of Slavery in Brazil, 60-61.  
 
28
 J. Nabuco, Minha formação, 139; C. Nabuco, Life of Joaquim Nabuco, 53; Gilberto Freyre, 
introduction to Minha formação, 6. 
 
29
 Speech of Martim Francisco, 9 Oct. 1879, BCCD Anais, vol. 5, 313. 
 
30
 C. Nabuco, Life of Joaquim Nabuco, 52-58. 
 
15 
 
numbers of slaves sold, the required emancipation in fourteen years, and the 
provision that any of the seventy-six children who reached the age of twenty-one 
during the time of the contract would receive letters of manumission on their 
twenty-first birthday.  Nabuco then claimed that the most "vicious" and 
"criminal" aspect of the enslavement involved the fact that only 170 of the 
original 385 slaves were still alive in 1879. The majority had died as slaves when 
they should have lived as freed men and women.  He then asked disgustedly: 
"Why for twenty years has no action been taken? Why has justice slept for twenty 
years? Why has this crime been constantly perpetrated for twenty years?"31   
 Deputy Ignacio Martins answered Nabuco alleging that the contract "was 
completely unknown" in Brazil and claimed he had not known of it despite 
residing in the municipality where the mine was located.  Deputy Galdino 
Emiliano das Neves countered Martins's statement of ignorance by alleging that 
"in Minas, everyone knew" of the contract.  Martins then craftily defended 
himself against any insinuations of complicity by asking Neves if he knew of the 
contract, why, "did he not denounce it?"  Neves replied that he was no "snitch." 
Martins quickly retorted to "snitch in favor of liberty is always honorable."32 
Despite the personal conflicts that erupted around the case of the Cata Branca 
slaves on the afternoon of 26 August 1879, the Chamber passed a resolution 
strongly urging the Minister of Justice to investigate the affair immediately and 
relay all information to the legislative body.33 
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 The St. John responded quickly to the accusations leveled against it in the 
legislature and in the subsequent reports in the Brazilian press.  On 12 September 
1879 a letter from the mining company appeared in the Rio de Janeiro Jornal do 
Comercio entitled "The St. John d'el Rey Company to the public."  The St. John did 
not deny that superintendent Gordon had registered the slaves as belonging to 
the Cata Branca company, and acknowledged that he should not have claimed to 
represent the Cata Branca company, which he did not.  The St. John, however, 
emphasized that a new superintendent, Pearson Morrison, had replaced Gordon 
in 1876 and could not be held accountable for Gordon's action.34  Nabuco 
responded to the distinction between past and present superintendents by 
stating:  
"The principal responsibility belongs neither to Mr. Gordon nor to Mr. 
Morrison for they are employees of the company. . . . The principal 
responsibility rests upon those who receive the profits, upon the 
shareholders, upon the whole company, which for twenty years has been 
enjoying the proprietorship and salaries of over two hundred men."35   
In Nabuco's view it did not matter who registered the slaves; what mattered was 
why they were not manumitted in 1859. 
 In the same letter to the public, the mining company stated that the reason 
the Cata Branca slaves did not receive their freedom was because the St. John 
continued to "pay the salary of the slaves punctually" to the Cata Branca 
company.36  Why would the St. John continue to pay an extinct mining company 
for the labor of slaves after the contract expired in 1859?  The mining company 
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claimed that the original 1845 contract had been amended in 1857 to extend the 
enslavement of the Cata Branca slaves.  The St. John turned the 1857 contract 
over to judicial authorities investigating the case, and part of it appeared 
reprinted in the Rio News on 5 October 1879.  The question then became, was  the 
second contract valid, and did the St. John and the Cata Branca company have 
the right to amend the original one.37  
 In reference to the latter question, the St. John argued the Cata Branca 
slaves represented "objects" of both contracts, and not "parties" to it.  This created 
a legal dilemma.  That is, could two "parties" agree to alter the terms of a contract 
regarding property even if the "object," as in this case, consisted of human 
beings?  Slaveowners had the right to alter or abolish contracts for conditional 
manumission until the Free Womb Law prohibited revocation in 1871.  Despite 
the legal authority of masters to revoke conditional manumissions before 1871, 
Brazilian courts often favored slaves in manumission suits as a device to police 
slaveholder behavior so as to not engender rebellion among slaves.   Pedrigão 
Malheiro, a respected jurist, publicist, slaveowner, and conservative advocate of 
gradual abolition, published an essay in 1867 that sought to define and clarify the 
Byzantine legal rights of slaveowners and slaves.  Malheiro argued that slaves 
were free by natural law, but legal fiction reduced them to slavery.   According to 
Malheiro, conditional manumission, "once conferred gave the slave the 
acquisition of the right to freedom, but delayed or suspended the slave from 
exercising that right."38  While the St. John may have had the legal authority to 
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extend the original contract in 1857, general and legal opinion regarding slavery 
had been greatly altered by the redefinition of the relationship between masters 
and slaves during the second half of the nineteenth century as a result of the Free 
Womb Law.  When the illegal retention of the Cata Branca slaves became public 
knowledge in 1879, the actions of the St. John represented a violation of the 
intent of the Free Womb Law to accommodate slave resistance in order to stave 
off widespread rebellion.  The Rio News criticized the St. John's claim that it had a 
legal right to amend the contract in light of the changing relations between 
masters and slaves: "It is difficult to believe that any Englishman would seriously 
offer such a defense, even were it justified in law."39   
 The St. John's defense against the abolitionists boiled down to the 1857 
contract.  The company's own records, however, call into question the very 
existence of a second contract.  According to the minutes of the company's board 
of directors, only in 1859--not in 1857--did the St. John take any action regarding 
possibly extending the 1845 contract.  John Dinston Powles, chairman of the St. 
John, reported to the board of directors on 18 May 1859 that he had contacted a 
Mr. Harding, who represented the Cata Branca company, "in reference to the 
agreement for the hiring of the Cata Branca Negroes which will expire on 
September next."  Powles reported that "he considered that the emancipation of 
the Negroes, which had been contemplated to take place at the end of the 
agreement was a measure wholly inadvisable, in every point of view, and 
particularly with reference to the welfare of the Negroes themselves."  Mr. 
Harding told Powles that he believed the directors of the Cata Branca company 
would "be ready to enter into a fresh agreement for seven years."40 Although the 
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board closed the meeting with a resolution to solicit a response from the Cata 
Branca company regarding a new contract, surprisingly, there was no further 
mention of a contract in the board minutes until 1877.41 
 The last statement of Chairman Powles, on 18 May 1859, may answer why 
the contract was not discussed again in the board minutes for nearly twenty 
years.  Although Mr. Harding claimed that "it was quite competent for the 
directors of the two companies to enter into any fresh agreement," Powles 
advised the St. John board of directors to seek "the opinion of counsel as to the 
legality of renewing the agreement."42  When the board met on 6 July 1859, the 
last entry briefly acknowledged the receipt of counsel's opinion "in reference to 
the Cata Branca blacks," but did not state whether or not the lawyer advised in 
favor of extending the contract.43  The board adopted no resolution to act upon 
the advice provided. The board understood, as it stated in the 18 May 1859 
meeting, that the contract expired in September, yet no reference to the Cata 
Branca slaves appears in the board minutes again until 7 November 1877.44  If 
counsel advised against the legality of a second contract, the board of directors 
may have decided not to pursue extending the contract.  Instead, the mining 
company may have simply ignored the emancipation clause of the 1845 contract. 
 This conclusion is bolstered by observing the company's willingness to 
ignore other clauses of the 1845 contract that did not serve its economic interests.  
The 1845 contract specified that "of the said Negroes and children as are now 
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under the age of twenty-one years and who shall attain that age during the 
subsistence of the agreement shall on their respectively attaining that age be 
absolutely free and emancipated."45  The board  of directors' deliberate decision 
not to free children once they reached the age of twenty-one deserves to be 
quoted in its entirety. 
The Chairman stated to Mr. Harding that the St. John d'el Rey Company 
had never carried into effect that condition in the agreement which provides 
for the children of the Negroes being emancipated as soon as they should 
attain the age of 21 from an apprehension, in which mine officers at Morro 
Velho concurred, that it was a very unsafe proceeding in regard to the 
future well being of the young people themselves, who would be exempt 
from all control or discipline, at the very time when they required it most.  
The directors were further moved by the consideration that there would be 
a great unstableness in emancipating children while the parents remained 
slaves, and further that it would be an exhibition on the establishment in the 
eyes of the Negroes themselves, of something very like a caprice to see one 
set of children placed at liberty, while another set remained in bondage.46 
If emancipating children once they reached the age of twenty-one represented a 
dangerous "exhibition" of freedom, then a massive manumission of hundreds of 
slaves could have had apocalyptic implications, not to mention the loss of several 
hundred laborers. 
 An emancipation of hundreds of individuals would surely have disrupted 
the St. John's well-developed manumission policy. The mining company 
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maintained its power and authority over 1,700 slaves through a manumission 
system of rewards based upon good behavior and productivity.  English traveler 
Richard Burton, who stayed at the Morro Velho mine for several months in 1867 
and wrote to chairman Powles that "I have carefully looked into the conditions of 
the Blacks and I find that it can hardly by any means be bettered,"  provides a 
brief discussion of the policy in his two volume travel account, Explorations of the 
Highlands of Brazil.47  According to Burton, slaves received a special issue of 
clothing that they wore on every other Sunday for a ceremony called the Revista 
(review).  At the Revista, over a thousand slaves lined up in military "columns" 
separated by sex in front of the Casa Grande (big house).  They received public 
recognition from the superintendent and overseers and merit stripes of a "broad 
red band" to adorn their Sunday Revista clothing based upon good behavior.  
After earning seven merit stripes, the slave received her or his freedom.48  Over 
time, control at the mine and disciplining the labor force became increasingly 
concentrated in the Revista ceremony that fueled, legitimated, and rewarded 
slaves' aspirations of freedom.  If the St. John had granted the Cata Branca slaves 
their freedom according to the 1845 contract, it would have undermined their 
authority and the stability the Sunday Revista manumission policy provided.  In 
1859, the board  clearly stated its opposition to the manumission of the Cata 
Branca slaves because the "system of making emancipation the reward of good 
conduct . . . was the safe and prudent one, and the only one likely to do any real 
good."49 
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 The absence of conclusive evidence in regard to extending the contract of 
the Cata Branca slaves in addition to the board of directors expressing no qualms 
about ignoring the emancipatory provision of the 1845 contract for children calls 
into question the existence and authenticity of the 1857 contract.  Yet, if such a 
contract did exist, albeit unrecoverable from the existing documentation, and if 
the mining company continued to "pay punctually the salaries of the slaves" to 
the Cata Branca company as they claimed in the Jornal do Comercio, we should 
expect to find it in their account books.50  Every year the board  of directors 
distributed an Annual Report to the stockholders that described the activities of 
the company.  The balance sheets for the years 1847-58 all contain an entry "Hire 
of Cata Branca Negroes" that varies from £3,125 for 1847, £2,500 for the years 
1848-53, and £1,500 for the years 1854-58 in accordance with the 1845 contract.51  
If the St. John continued to pay the Cata Branca company under a new contract,  
we should expect the same entry in the balance sheets to continue to appear.  
After 1858, however, the entry disappears.  Thus, the clearest proof that a second 
contract existed, a financial commitment, does not appear in their records. 
 Nabuco's denunciation in the Chamber and the reports in the Rio de 
Janeiro press brought, judicial, legislative, and popular criticism to mining 
activities at Morro Velho, but speeches and sensational reports could not alone 
secure the freedom of the Cata Branca slaves.  Other factors, although not as 
dramatic or press-worthy, but just as important, worked in favor of liberation.  
First, the nationality of the company was British.  Nabuco could not have 
denounced the mining company as effectively and confidently had it been 
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Brazilian.  Deputies who represented slave provinces and slaveholders' interests 
continued to command a strong block within the Chamber on issues relating to 
slavery.  According to Nabuco, speaking in 1880: "On all matters relative to 
freedom we could count on . . . [only] ten votes."52  Had the St. John been 
Brazilian, the many deputies who campaigned for slaveholders' interests may 
have rallied against Nabuco's attacks.  The dissonance between Great Britain's 
public support for abolition and the employment of slaves at Morro Velho 
provided a rare opportunity for Nabuco and the abolitionists.  In a letter to 
Charles H. Allen, secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 
Nabuco wrote: "The Saint John d'el Rey Mining Company and its accomplices 
never had more constant and uncompromising enemies than her Britannic 
Majesty's representatives in Brazil. . . . I was rendering a service both to the 
English nation and to the Morro Velho slaves."53  The British nationality of the 
mining company made them especially vulnerable to the Cata Branca scandal. 
 Nationalism also worked in an ironic manner.  Great Britain pressured 
Brazil throughout the nineteenth century to abolish the slave trade and slavery.  
In 1863 the conflict between the two countries culminated during William D. 
Christie's tenure as British minister in Brazil over the treatment of emancipados--
Africans found aboard slave ships, emancipated, and then turned over for a 
period of apprenticeship to the Brazilian government or the service of private 
individuals--that resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations.  For many 
Brazilians, especially slaveowners, abolitionism and British imperialism became 
synonymous.  As a result, those who championed the anti-slavery cause had to 
defend themselves against accusations of being Anglophiles, vile creatures of the 
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British, and traitors to their country that crippled their ability to campaign 
effectively for abolition.  In the case of the St. John's retention of the Cata Branca 
slaves these allegations did not apply.  In fact, the Cata Branca scandal 
represented the exact opposite:  Brazilian abolitionists attacked a British 
slaveholder.  Thus, abolitionists could assail the British slaveholder without fear 
of being labeled unpatriotic.54 
 Not only did international politics and nationalism favor the Cata Branca 
slaves, but economic factors also contributed to the St. John's vulnerability.  The 
driving force behind the slave economy in the last decades before abolition was 
coffee cultivation.  In 1883 when Joaquim Nabuco wrote O Abolicionismo, he 
quoted fellow deputy Gaspar Silveira Martins who summed up the slave-coffee 
nexus: "Brazil is coffee and coffee is the Negro."55  Although Minas Gerais 
represented the most populous slave province in Brazil,  deputy Silveira 
Martins's dictum did not apply to mining.  In their demographic study of 
nineteenth-century Minas Gerais, Martins Filho and Martins go so far as to claim 
that by the 1870s the "number of slaves employed in mining probably did not 
exceed 2,000."56  Recent scholarship has shown the portrait of small-scale 
subsistence agriculture drawn by Martins Filho and Martins overlooked how 
mining, textile production, and cultivation of foodstuffs for coffee plantations 
provided a significant degree of complexity to the Minas Gerais economy.  
Nevertheless, the vast majority of slaves worked in agricultural tasks.  According 
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to Conrad's analysis of the 1872 census, of the 370,459 slaves in Minas Gerais, 
278,767 labored as "farm workers."57  Thus, the abolitionists' focus on the St. John 
threatened neither the slave system as a whole nor the foundations of the 
Brazilian economy as an attack on coffee planters would have done.  Nabuco's 
speeches, the Brazilian press, external political pressure, nationalism, and 
economic factors all conspired against the mining company.  
 The judicial authority investigating the case at the municipality of Sabará 
wasted no time in handing down a decision after the abolitionist press had 
created a frenzy of excitement.  On 14 October 1879, the district judge Frederico 
Augusto Álvares da Silva issued a verdict stating that the Cata Branca slaves 
shall "be declared free from the beginning of 1860, and that they be paid the 
wages due from . . . 1860 up to the date of" freedom.  The verdict paraphrased 
Malheiro's opinion on the revocation of conditional manumission by arguing 
that the St. John did not have the legal authority to alter the terms of enslavement 
because once the 1845 contract had been published and registered, the slaves 
"acquired the right to their liberty," and as a result it was "unlawful for the 
contracting parties to modify their wishes in a manner prejudicial to the rights 
[the Cata Branca slaves had] acquired."  Concerning the authenticity of the 1857 
contract, the judge did not have access to the internal documentation of the 
company described above, but reached the same conclusion.  Whereas the first 
contract between the St. John and Cata Branca Brazilian company was published 
and registered in London, the 1857 contract was ruled "clandestine because it did 
not have publicity," and therefore "useless."  The judge made sure to point out 
the clandestine nature of the contract in his ruling by emphasizing that "as the 
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minister of Her Britannic Majesty asserted, it had no publicity."  The judge's 
comment indicates that English authorities in Brazil cooperated with the 
investigation to liberate the slaves.  His ruling concluded that the 1857 contract 
"was only drawn up in London on July 21, 1877" in response to the 1877 
investigation that "had already been begun on the 11th of June of the same 
year."58  The remaining 123 living slaves immediately received their letters of 
emancipation.   
 José Antonio Alonzo de Brito, the chief of police of the province of Minas 
Gerais, sent "a sufficient detachment of the police force" to Morro Velho "under 
the orders of a military delegate" to liberate the slaves.  The show of force likely 
had two purposes: first, to make sure the St. John freed the slaves; and second, to 
maintain order for fear that the emancipation of 123 slaves might inspire violent 
protest among other bondsmen at Morro Velho.  The superintendent of the mine, 
Pearson Morrison, met the police force and then "gave orders for those who were 
to be freed to assemble on the lawn of the Casa Grande."  After the Cata Branca 
slaves had gathered in front of the superintendent's house, Morrison "read the 
order for the execution of the sentence, and the slaves of the Cata Branca 
Company [were] declared free."59  Morrison's actions of lining up the Cata 
Branca slaves and then reading the declaration of freedom reveals an attempt to 
maintain the legitimacy of the Revista ceremony for the others at the mine who 
witnessed the liberation of 123 slaves. 
 The struggle did not end with the verdict.  The St. John appealed the 
decision.  The back wages to the freed slaves represented a huge financial sum of 
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£36,640.  The mining company, however, did not have much bargaining power.  
Not only did the Cata Branca scandal weaken the St. John politically, but the 
Brazilian government in 1878 placed a four percent tax on all profits derived 
from gold in Minas Gerais.  In the fall of 1879, the board of directors decided "in 
consideration of the many important questions now pending forth at Rio de 
Janeiro and Morro Velho whether the time had not arrived for another visit by a 
member of the board."60  Shortly thereafter, board member Frederick Tendron 
traveled to Brazil in 1880 to investigate the Cata Branca case and lobby the 
Brazilian parliament to have the tax revoked.61   
 While the primary purpose of Tendron's trip was to appeal the four 
percent tax, the Cata Branca scandal severely impaired his mission.  The British 
Foreign Office refused to aid the St. John in repealing the gold tax.  Lord 
Salisbury summed up the views of the Foreign Office in no uncertain terms when 
he wrote to the company declaring "the protection of Her Majesty's legation 
cannot properly be extended to a British Co. whose proceedings have been . . . 
declared to be in violation of the Slave Trade Acts."62  Tendron complained that 
the company had to lobby the Brazilian parliament by themselves "without any 
support from our side" because of the Cata Branca case.63  Even before landing in 
Brazil, Tendron reported in a letter marked "private," so as to not have it read at 
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the board meetings as was customary, that he was "violently. . . assailed . . . on 
the subject of the Cata Branca blacks" by a merchant on the ship to Rio de 
Janeiro.64  The negative publicity surrounding the illegal enslavement in Rio, 
prompted Tendron to visit Mr. Seally of the Anglo-Brazilian Times to counter the 
reports in the Rio News.  He even offered to "meet the English residents and 
explain" the situation personally.65  When Tendron called upon members of the 
Brazilian parliament who had supported the mining company in the past, they 
proved unwilling to lend assistance because of the Cata Branca scandal.  The 
board of directors had originally decided to tell members of the Chamber that 
they would refuse to pay the tax, but according to Tendron, the plan changed 
because "I could not allow an impression to spread that the Board  were afraid to 
enforce their orders [the 4 percent tax] because of the Cata Branca Scandal."66  
 Tendron's efforts to appeal the decision that granted the Cata Branca 
slaves their back wages fared no better than his attempt to repeal the four 
percent tax.  He could not build a case for appeal and lobby for the revoking of 
the four percent tax at the same time.  The superintendent of the Morro Velho 
mine, Pearson Morrison, apparently concluding defeat on the slavery issue, 
requested that Tendron no longer take "any step in connection with Cata Branca" 
and work "solely with the provincial tax."67  In October of 1881, the Supreme 
Court upheld the lower court's decision that granted the Cata Branca slaves their 
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freedom and back wages.  On 21 October 1881, the board of directors gathered 
for a "special" meeting to discuss the telegram sent by superintendent Morrison 
informing them of the Supreme Court's decision.  The Chairman, Hockin, then 
sent a telegram to Morrison that stated the "Board must rely altogether on your 
judgement . . . you are at liberty to compromise a sum."68  
 Did the St. John pay the Cata Branca slaves their back wages?  The past 
conduct of the company warrants skepticism. The board  minutes, Annual 
Reports, and other company sources provide no evidence of compliance.  The St. 
John even decided not to inform stockholders about the verdict. They had to 
address the Cata Branca case, however, because the British and Foreign Anti-
slavery Society continued to print stories about events at Morro Velho in the 
Anti-Slavery Reporter.69  In a pamphlet entitled Memorandum by the Company dated 
November, 1881, the St. John repeated their justifications for not freeing the Cata 
Branca slaves because the 1857 contract extended the enslavement and argued 
manumission "would be very injurious to the true welfare of the slaves 
themselves."70  The Annual Report distributed at the 1882 stockholder meeting, 
notwithstanding receipt of Morrison's telegram to the contrary, stated "no 
decision has yet been arrived at with regard to the case pending before the 
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Supreme Court of Appeal at Rio."71  After 1882, there is no further mention of the 
Cata Branca slaves in St. John sources and no indication of the payment of back 
wages. 
 If the Cata Branca slaves did not receive their back wages, would not the 
abolitionists who championed their cause in 1879 have voiced opposition?  
Abolitionists, both in Britain and Brazil, continued to focus their attention on the 
employment of slave labor at Morro Velho, but no reference appears in regard to 
back wages from abolitionist sources either.  Nabuco regularly corresponded 
with the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society who, in turn, had members of 
the House of Commons pressure the St. John to release the remaining (non Cata 
Branca) slaves held at Morro Velho.  The abolitionists' focus on liberating the 
other slaves held by the mining company did not end their interest in the Cata 
Branca case.  Following the October 1881 decision, Nabuco wrote to the British 
and Foreign Anti-slavery Society to inform them of the verdict.  Charles H. Allen, 
Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, responded to Nabuco's 
letter in November by thanking him for his "kind interest and assistance in the 
matter," and acknowledging receipt of the Supreme Court's decision.72   Because 
we could logically expect the abolitionists to protest if the St. John did not 
compensate the ex-slaves for back wages, we could possibly assume some form 
of payment was made that simply did not appear in the Annual Reports for fear 
that it might have caused stockholders to withdraw their shares.  Or, the lack of 
desire by the abolitionists to have freed slaves monetarily compensated for their 
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illegal enslavement, in contrast with their enthusiasm to see them emancipated, 
pointedly reveals the socio-economic limitations of the abolition movement at its 
very beginning.  Post-emancipation Brazil would witness government subsidies 
to aid European migrants while ex-slaves would receive no financial equivalents. 
The questions if payment was made, how much, and over what period of time 
remains elusive from the available documentation.73  
 The 1881 Supreme Court decision ended the history of the illegal 
enslavement of the Cata Branca slaves.  Tragically, for twenty years several 
hundred individuals remained enslaved in the pursuit of profits for a British 
mining company.  "Unhappily and far more lamentable," Nabuco later wrote, 
"out of 38[5] slaves, who in 1845, obtained a perfect right by a legal title to their 
liberty . . . only 123 appeared to receive their letters of freedom from the hands of 
public justice."74  Those who died, however, did not die in vain.  The massive 
emancipation the board feared that would "create serious dissatisfaction, if not 
insurrectionary movements among the slaves in the neighbourhood" did 
undermine their "good-behaviour" gradual manumission policy, albeit twenty 
years later.75  The liberation of 123 slaves, in "the eyes of the Negroes 
themselves," hastened the demise of slavery at Morro Velho by undermining the 
company's manumission policy that served to maintain order and act as a 
conserving force over a large slave population.76  The case attracted world 
attention and condemnation to the activities of Her Majesty's subjects in Minas 
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Gerais.  As a result, the St. John, which held as many as 1,700 individuals in 
bondage in 1867 and possibly represented the largest slaveholder in the most 
populous slave province in Brazil, liberated the remaining slaves who worked its 
gold mines in 1882.  In this case, the scandal created over the illegal enslavement, 
functioned to liberate all of the slaves al Morro Velho.77 
 Although a sensational court case dramatically contributed to the end of 
slavery at Morro Velho, St. John sources are noticeably silent on any significant 
changes in mining operations as a result of the transition to wage labor.  
Stockholders continued to receive dividend checks from the company and 
mineral extraction from the mine showed no conspicuous irregularities after 
emancipation.    Apparently, enough freed slaves continued to work and live at 
the mine, where they had developed their own sense of community, that the 
mining company did not suffer a debilitating labor crisis.  To compensate for the 
freed slaves who did choose to leave the mine and find a new employer, board 
member Frederick Tendron recruited Canadian, Italian, and Chinese miners but 
found that "the Cata Branca business. . . unsettled" laborers and prevented some 
from signing on.78   The significant changes that did occur at Morro Velho in the 
1880s did not reflect the end of slavery, but rather, the mine collapse on 10 
November 1886 that paralyzed production for nearly ten years.79 
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 The significance of the Cata Branca case did not remain limited to Morro 
Velho alone.  According to historian Robert Conrad, 1879 represented the 
beginning of "uncompromising abolitionism" and the advent of "a new and more 
powerful antislavery movement."80  The Cata Branca case served as an important 
cause célèbre for the Brazilian abolitionist movement.  Brazilian abolitionists 
easily coalesced around the case because it involved a British slaveholder, a 
politically weak and isolated enterprise, leant itself to the invocation of 
nationalism, the economics of the mining sector, and exposed a flagrant violation 
of a contract. All of the aforementioned characteristics would not have applied to 
a coffee cultivator or other Brazilian slaveholders.  Thus, the case offered a 
special opportunity to forge the abolitionists' cause and put into action what 
many believed.   
 The event quickly earned Joaquim Nabuco and the abolitionists 
recognition as a new and powerful force in Brazilian politics.  The case had such 
importance to abolitionists that the credit for freeing the Cata Branca slaves 
became disputed in the Rio News.  On 7 September 1880, the day of Brazilian 
independence, the Sociedade Brasileira Contra a Escravidão (Brazilian Anti-
Slavery Society) formed at Nabuco's house.  In November of that year, the 
organization began publishing O Abolicionista to "fight slavery" and show "that 
slave labor was the only cause for the industrial and economic backwardness of 
[Brazil]."81  The formation of the society coincided with the emergence of popular 
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anti-slavery sentiment and the appearance of abolitionist clubs that swept the 
country inaugurating the dominant theme of Brazilian politics until the 1888 
"Golden Law" declared abolition.  While Great Britain deserves recognition as a 
precursor worldwide in championing the abolitionist cause, and Brazil is no 
exception, a national scandal involving a British mining company that illegally 
held free men, women, and children as slaves for twenty years ironically 
represents one of the first victories of the Brazilian anti-slavery crusade that 
served as an important catalyst in mobilizing a wider public behind the overall 
abolition movement.82 
 
It is the public scandal that offends;  
to sin in secret is no sin at all. 
-Molière (1622-1673) 
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